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By Owen F. Humpage
U.S. exchange-market interventions have no apparent effect on market fundamentals, but
may influence expectations.  If intervention can accurately forecast exchange-rate movements,
knowledge that the Federal Reserve was trading will cause traders to alter their prior estimates of
the distribution of exchange-rate changes.  This paper finds that U.S. intervention has value only
as a forecast that recent exchange-rate movements will moderate, but not that they will reverse.
Less than half of the interventions, however, seem successful, and the favorable results are
generally confined to two relatively short periods that are characterized by uncertainty about
future Federal Reserve policies.1.  Introduction
Official U.S. foreign-currency transactions have no apparent effect on the basic
economic determinants of exchange rates, but may sometimes color the market’s
perceptions and expectations of those fundamentals.  To do so, U.S. monetary authorities
must be able to improve the flow of information to the private sector through their official
transactions.  The market will view the Federal Reserve as an informed trader only if that
intervention accurately predicts future exchange-rate movements.  Using a test suggested
by Merton (1981), developed in Henriksson and Merton (1981), and applied to U.S.
intervention profits by Leahy (1995), this paper investigates the value of U.S. intervention
in forecasting subsequent exchange-rate movements.
A principal difficulty in applying this test arises in determining exactly what
information about equilibrium exchange-rate patterns U.S. monetary authorities intend to
relay to the market.  I offer four specific definitions against which I test the forecast value
of intervention.  Although these definitions are somewhat arbitrary and are not
comprehensive, each is readily verifiable and each is consistent with the rather nebulous
official criterion of “calming market disorder.”
The results offer three insights into U.S. interventions:  First, official U.S. foreign
exchange transactions have value as a signal that current appreciations or depreciations
will slow.  Intervention does not indicate that the exchange rate will change direction, nor
even that it will appreciate or depreciate.  Second, although intervention has had positive
forecast value, the actual number of successful transactions is relatively small.  Third,
U.S. intervention generally had forecast value only during the Plaza episode (September
23, 1985, through December 31, 1985) and immediately following the 1987 stock-market2
crash (October 19, 1987, through December 31, 1987).  At other times after the Louvre
Agreement, when the United States attempted to stabilized dollar exchange rates, and
during the recent period of reluctant U.S. involvement, intervention has had no obvious
forecast value.  These results suggest that intervention’s ability to influence exchange
rates is rather limited.
The next section briefly summarizes current thinking about the relationship
between intervention and exchange rates.  Section 3 defines the four success criteria for
intervention.  Section 4 describes the Henriksson and Merton test, and the results follow
in section 5.  The paper concludes with a summary and a comparison with some other
results.
2.  Intervention and the Channels of Influence
Economists’ doubts about the effectiveness of U.S. intervention originate with the
Federal Reserve’s practice of routinely sterilizing the monetary effects of its official
exchange-market transactions through offsetting open-market operations.  The Fed does
so to avoid conflicts with domestic monetary-policy objectives and to prevent the U.S.
Treasury, which directs U.S. intervention and maintains its own foreign-exchange
accounts, from impinging on the Federal Reserve’s independence.
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Although this monetary offset eliminates the most obvious and direct influence
that intervention could have on exchange rates—relative changes in the U.S. and foreign
money stocks—the process alters the currency composition of publicly held government
debt.  According to the portfolio-balance approach to exchange-rate determination,
changes in the currency composition of outstanding debt can affect exchange rates,
independent of monetary policies.  With the possible exception of Dominguez and3
Frankel (1993), empirical studies find no evidence that intervention alters exchange rates
through a portfolio-balance channel (see Edison [1993]).
Even if intervention does not operate by changing stocks of money and
government bonds, it might still influence exchange rates by affecting either the market’s
perception of current fundamentals or its expectations about future changes in
fundamentals.  Traditional asset market approaches to exchange-rate determination treat
information as a costless public good, with spot exchange rates serving a purely allocative
function.  Such models perform poorly, especially out of sample, and they can explain
neither the large volume of trades nor the volatility of exchange rates.
In response, microstructure approaches to exchange markets relax the assumptions
that information is publicly available and that agents in the market are homogeneous in
their interpretations of information and in their degree of risk aversion.  Ito (1988), for
example, suggests that market participants are not homogeneous in their beliefs.  Ito,
Lyons and Melvin (1998) provide evidence of private information.  The prevalence of
profitable technical trading rules, as demonstrated by Neely, Weller, and Dittmar  (1997),
also attests to information asymmetries.  Goldberg and Frydman (1996) show that
imperfect knowledge about fundamentals can generate exchange-rate patterns more
consistent with observed exchange-rate behavior than with rational expectations models.
Under all such circumstances, prices play more than an allocative role; they can convey
information signals that affect agents’ preferences directly.
Monetary authorities might sometimes possess better information than other
market players and might use intervention as a means of conveying that information to
the market.  A central bank, for example, could have superior knowledge about an4
impending change in monetary policy or about the exchange-rate consequence of current
macroeconomic developments in general.
2  Nevertheless, it remains open to debate
whether a central bank routinely has better information than other experienced market
participants—even about monetary policies.  Should a central bank routinely have
superior information, knowledge that the Federal Reserve was transacting on that
knowledge would have value to other traders, even if intervention did not directly change
market fundamentals.  What follows is a test of the proposition that the Federal Reserve
is an informed trader.
3
3.  Successful Intervention
The stated objective of U.S. intervention policy is to “counter disorderly market
conditions,” a goal that eludes a simple, precise, or even objective definition.  In the
following analysis, I define successful interventions in terms of four specific criteria.  The
idea is that a successful intervention provides some unspecified information that alters
exchange rates in an identifiable manner.  While these definitions might not encompass
every possible interpretation of a successful intervention, they are all readily verifiable
and cover a range of outcomes that most economists would regard as consistent with the
goal of countering disorderly markets.
Alter Exchange Rates
The first success criterion presumes that U.S. monetary authorities use official
sales or purchases of foreign exchange to signal that market fundamentals are consistent
with a dollar appreciation or depreciation, respectively.  Accordingly, under the first
success criterion, w1st equals one—indicating success—whenever an official U.S. sale of5
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In these expressions, It is official U.S. intervention at time t, with positive (negative)
values indicating sales (purchases) of foreign exchange.  The United States conducts all
of its intervention in either German marks or Japanese yen.  The exchange-rate term
DS SPM SAM tt t =- , where SAMt and SPMt are the morning opening (9:00 a.m.) and
afternoon closing (4:00 p.m.) bid quotations.
5  These are taken from the New York
market.  As Goodhart and Hesse (1993) indicate, nearly all U.S. intervention occurs
between these times, typically while the European markets are still open.  The exchange
rates are either German marks or Japanese yen per dollar.
Change the Direction of the Exchange Rate
A second, more stringent, success criterion assumes that U.S. monetary authorities
intend official sales of foreign exchange as a signal that the dollar will stop depreciating
and will appreciate instead.  Similarly, official purchases of foreign exchange are a
forecast that the dollar will stop appreciating and will depreciate.  Again, I presume that
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In expression 2, DSAM SAM SAM tt t =- - 1  and all other variables are defined as before.
Smooth Exchange-Rate Movements
Empirical estimates of intervention reaction functions typically report evidence of
smoothing exchange-rate movements or leaning against the wind as a policy objective
(see Almekinders [1995] and Edison [1993]).  Through its intervention, the United States
may intend to indicate to the market that the current rate of appreciation or depreciation
will slow, but will not reverse itself.  Accordingly:
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Foster Exchange-Rate Movements
U.S. monetary authorities may sometimes attempt to encourage a movement of
the dollar that was already underway—to lean with the wind.  In such a case, intervention
sales or purchases of foreign exchange would attempt to signal that market fundamentals
are consistent with a continued appreciation or depreciation of the dollar, but at a faster
pace.  Reflecting this criterion:
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To convey the information outlined under any or all of these criterion
successfully, intervention must forecast with a high frequency of success.  Otherwise, the
market will not regard the Federal Reserve as an informed trader.  The next section
defines a “high frequency” of success.
4.  Forecast Value
Merton (1981) and Henriksson and Merton (1981) develop a nonparametric test to
evaluate investment managers’ ability to predict the relative performance of stocks and
bonds.  Leahy (1995) used this procedure to investigate profits from intervention.
Treating intervention as an official forecast of near-term dollar movements, I apply the
Henriksson and Merton procedure.  Evidence of exceptional forecasting skills would
suggest that U.S. monetary authorities acted with superior information and that they
successfully conveyed that information to the market.  An advantage of this procedure is
that it does not require specific assumptions about the distribution of exchange-rate
changes.  A disadvantage is that it only investigates the number of times intervention is
successful, not the magnitude of any effect.
As an illustration of the procedure, I will discuss U.S. purchases of German marks
with the objective of promoting a dollar depreciation against the mark (criterion 1a) over
the entire January 1985 through March 1997 sample period.  Consistent with the success
criterion, I define:
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In expression 6a), p1 is the probability that the Federal Reserve successfully sells
foreign exchange on a given day conditional on the dollar appreciating over that day, and
p2 is the probability that the Federal Reserve does not sell foreign exchange conditional
on the exchange rate not appreciating.  According to Merton (1981), a necessary and
sufficient condition for intervention to have no predictive value to the market is that
pp 11 2 =- , or that  pp 12 1 += .  In this case, traders would not modify their prior
estimates of the distribution of exchange-rate changes as a result of intervention.  If
instead intervention conveyed perfect information to the market, p1 = 1 and p2 = 1 and
pp 12 2 += .  For a forecast to have positive value,  pp 12 1 +> .  Similarly, for a forecast
to have negative value,  pp 12 1 +< .
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I obtain estimates of the respective probabilities from the sample data (see table
1).  For the case at hand: n1 is the number of successful mark purchases (51); n2 is the
number of unsuccessful mark purchases (87 = 138 - 51); N1 is the number of dollar
depreciations in the entire sample (1,564), and N2 is the remaining number of
observations (1,508 = 3,072 - 1,564).  It follows that: E(n1/N1) = p1 and E(n2/ N2) = 1 -
p2.  Hence,  $$ . pp 1 2 0 975 += .
Henriksson and Merton (1981) show that under the null hypothesis (p1 + p2 = 1),
the number of correct interventions will have a hypergeometric distribution.  This
provides a direct test of the null hypothesis, which does not depend on estimates of the9
conditional probabilities.  Assuming that n1 is a hypergeometric random variable, I reject
the null that p1 + p2 = 1 in favor of p1 + p2 > 1, if the probability of observing a greater
number of successes is very small—less than 5 percent.
8  I reject the null hypothesis in
favor of p1 + p2 < 1 if the probability of observing a greater number of successes is very
large—more than 95 percent.
5.  Empirical Results
I applied the Henriksson-Merton test procedure to each of the success criteria
(expressions 1 through 4) over the entire sample and over five subsamples.  As indicated
in the text below, the subperiods represent fairly distinct episodes of intervention in terms
of either the volume, or the objectives, of intervention.
9  Tables 1 through 6 present the
results.  In each table, the total number of observations (business days) in a period
appears at the top of the first column.  Column one lists the various success criteria.  The
number of interventions appears in the second column, and the corresponding number of
successful interventions shows in the third column.  The fourth displays the percentage of
successful interventions.  As indicated in column 4 of table 1, for example, 37 percent of
U.S. purchases of German marks and 46 percent of U.S. purchases of Japanese yen were
associated with dollar depreciations against these currencies.
The fifth column, labeled “virtual successes,” counts the number of times over the
sample period that the exchange rate behaved in a manner consistent with the
corresponding success criterion, whether or not intervention took place.  The sixth
column expresses this count as a percentage of the total number of observations.  Table 1
indicates that over the entire sample period, the mark-dollar exchange rate appreciated on10
1,564 days out of 3,072 (or 51 percent of the days), and the yen-dollar exchange rate
appreciated on 1,466 (or 48 percent).
Columns 7 and 8 present the estimated conditional probabilities, and the test
statistic appears in column 9.  I reject the null in favor of positive forecast value if 1-CDF
(in column 10) is less than 5 percent and in favor of negative forecast value if 1-CDF is
greater than 95 percent.  The last column summarizes the results; a blank indicates no
forecast value.
I next consider each subperiod—tables 2 though 4—before returning to the entire
period (table 1) as a summary.
Plaza Period: September 1985 through December 1985
In early 1985, the dollar began to depreciate against the German mark and
Japanese yen from its unusually high levels in the early 1980s.  In January and February,
the United States occasionally bought modest amounts of foreign exchange to stem any
hesitation or reversal in the dollar’s movement.  In late September, the G5 countries
signed the Plaza Accord, which pledged them to joint intervention with the objective of
fostering a further depreciation.
10  Intervention was relatively heavy in late September and
in October.  Between September 23, 1985 and December 31, 1985, the United States
purchased German marks on only 14 days and purchased Japanese yen on 20 days.  The
United States undertook no sales of foreign exchange in 1985.
The test results in table 2 permit one to reject the null hypothesis of no forecast
value in only two cases: Purchases of yen and marks have positive forecast value as a
prediction that yesterday’s dollar appreciation would moderate today.  That is, U.S.
monetary authorities could signal through their official purchases of marks and yen that11
upticks in a generally downward-moving market would moderate, but not that they would
reverse themselves.  This result is roughly similar to that in Humpage (1988), which
found very limited evidence of success using regression techniques.  Most striking in
table 2, however, is that contrary to the common perception of the period, the U.S. did not
lean with the wind.  If it attempted such a maneuver, it failed.  Intervention had no value
as a forecast that the dollar would appreciate or depreciate, or that it would change
directions.
First Louvre Period: February 1987 through October 1987
On February 22, 1987, the G7 countries met at the Louvre and agreed to joint
intervention with the objective of stabilizing dollar exchange rates at current levels.
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The United States intervened frequently and heavily against German marks and Japanese
yen, often in concert with Germany and Japan, through March 1990.  I have divided the
period into three sections.  During the first, which extended up to the October 16, 1987
stock-market crash, the United States intervened on 13 days against German marks and
on 25 days against Japanese yen (see table 3).  Intervention against German marks was
split fairly evenly between purchases and sales.  Intervention against yen was more
frequent, but consisted entirely of sales.  During this interval, the United States
moderately tightened (“snugged up”) monetary policy.
As table 3 indicates, only U.S. intervention sales of yen during this period had
positive forecast value and then only as a predictor that the previous day’s dollar
depreciation would moderate over the current day (leaning against the wind).  Out of the
25 interventions, 36 percent were successful, substantially above the expected outcome
(16 percent).  A higher-than-expected proportion of German purchases was successful (2012
percent), but not enough to reject the null hypothesis of no forecast value at the 95
percent confidence level.  U.S. intervention did not have positive forecast value for any
other success criteria during this period.
Second Louvre Period: October 1987 through December 1988
Although monetary policy briefly eased immediately following the October 19,
1987 stock market crash, the Federal Reserve tightened policy thereafter through the end
of 1988.  Between October 19, 1987 and December 30, 1987, the United States
intervened against German marks on 55 occasions, with purchases and sales of marks
fairly evenly split.  Over the same period, the United States sold yen on 39 days.  As table
4 indicates, U.S. intervention had positive value as a forecast that recent dollar
movements—against both the mark and the yen—would moderate, but not reverse.  The
proportion of successful interventions was substantially greater that the proportion of
virtual successes during this period.  These results indicate that intervention successfully
leaned against the wind in the aftermath of the stock-market crash.
Table 4 also shows that U.S. purchases of German marks had negative value as a
forecast that the dollar would depreciate.  The number of successes seems lower than one
might randomly find.  As noted earlier, this implies that the market could benefit from
betting against the Fed.  Notice, however, that this result is not inconsistent with the
positive value of intervention as a forecast of leaning against the wind:  Fed purchases of
German marks implied that the dollar would not depreciate, but that it would continue to
appreciate, albeit at a slower pace.
Third Louvre Period: January 3, 1989 through April 199013
The spirit of close cooperation, the hallmark of the Louvre accord, waned after the
stock market crash and throughout this later period.  U.S. monetary policy eased
somewhat after August 1989.  During this interval, the United States purchased German
marks on 79 occasions and Japanese yen on 83 occasions.  Intervention had no positive
forecast value over this period, under any criterion.  In one case, purchases of German
marks, intervention had negative forecast value.  These results may explain the FOMC
dissents on intervention-related directives and Federal Reserve’s growing reluctance to
participate with the Treasury in intervention over this period (see Humpage [1994]).
Limited Intervention: August 1990 through March 1997
During this last period, the United States grew increasingly reluctant to enter the
foreign-exchange market.  The Federal Reserve intervened on 28 days against German
marks and on 21 days against Japanese yen.  Nearly all the official transactions were sales
of foreign exchange, which suggests that intervention broadly aimed at limiting any
softening in the dollar relative to the mark or yen.  During this period, the United States
frequently seemed to have undertaken interventions out of a desire to show cooperation
with the Bundesbank or the Bank of Japan, rather than out of a firm belief that the dollar
was inconsistent with market fundamentals.  In hindsight, this seems an adequate
interpretation, since U.S. intervention over this period only had forecast value in two
disparate cases: purchases of marks under a leaning-against-the-wind success criterion
and purchases of yen under a leaning-with-the-wind success criterion.  Since the numbers
of interventions and successes in both cases are very small, these results could be
spurious.14
Full Sample: September 1985 through March 1997
The results for the entire sample period largely reflect the pattern that
predominates in most of the subperiods:  U.S. official exchange-market transactions have
positive value as a forecast that any current dollar appreciation or depreciation will slow
in the immediate term.  This seems to suggest that U.S. intervention can successfully lean
against the wind.  By no other criterion does U.S. intervention have positive forecast
value.  Notice, however, that the percentage of interventions that successfully leans
against the wind (24 percent) remains small.  Only a small number of interventions—less
than half—actually prove successful by any criterion.  From a policy perspective,
intervention does not seem very effective.
Overall, U.S. intervention purchases of German marks had negative forecast
value.  As noted above, this result is not incompatible with the finding of positive forecast
value for a leaning-against-the-wind criterion.
The fact that U.S. intervention has negative forecast value in terms of leaning with
the wind may simple reflect U.S. monetary authorities’desire to avoid this type of
intervention.  For example, when the United States operates to stem a dollar depreciation,
it has a finite stock of foreign reserves to sell.  To conserve foreign exchange, the Fed
may abstain from attempting to promote upticks in the market, and may instead wait to
see if these movements sustain themselves.  Similarly, when the dollar is appreciating,
official purchases of foreign exchange increase the exchange-risk exposure of U.S.
monetary authorities to foreign-currency losses.  To avoid increasing this exposure
unnecessarily, the United States may not buy foreign exchange when the dollar tips lower
(lean with the wind).  Instead, the Fed may abstain from intervening as long as the15
depreciation continues, even though it feels that the dollar is overvalued at current
exchange rates.
6.  Conclusions
Many economists believe that U.S. exchange-market intervention can affect dollar
exchange rates only through an expectations channel.  This requires that U.S. monetary
authorities have some advantage over private market participants with respect to the
acquisition and interpretations of information pertinent to the pricing of foreign exchange.
This paper tested that proposition.
Using a technology suggested by Merton (1981) and Henriksson and Merton
(1981), I asked if private-market participants could improve their near-term predictions of
the dollar from knowledge that the Federal Reserve was intervening.  The first major
result of this paper is that official U.S. foreign exchange transactions have positive
forecast value only as predictions that recent dollar appreciations or depreciations will
immediately dampen.  This seems to suggest that intervention could reduce exchange-rate
volatility.  Recent studies using either GARCH or implied volatility from options prices
have obtained mixed results respecting the impact of intervention on exchange-rate
volatility.  Chang and Taylor (1998), using Reuters screen data, find that volatility
increases after reports of intervention.  Dominguez (1998) finds that secret intervention
increases volatility.  Baillie and Osterberg (1997a b) find that intervention increases
volatility.  Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) find intervention either has no effect or
increases implied volatility. Unlike the current study, which counts events, these studies
compare quantitative magnitudes.  A few large effects might dominate.16
The finding that Federal Reserve intervention has positive value as a forecast that
recent exchange-rate changes will moderate seems consistent with LeBaron (1996) and
Neely and Weller (1997), who find that intervention improves the profitability of
technical trading rules.  Successfully leaning against the wind suggests that U.S. monetary
authorities incurred a short-term loss, since they acquired a currency that subsequently
depreciated.  Both LeBaron and Neely and Weller refer to leaning against the wind as a
possible explanation for their results.  This study supports their conjecture.
One must temper the policy implications of this first finding with the second
result:  The proportion of successful interventions is relatively small—generally less than
half.  If intervention operates primarily by influencing expectations, then conditioning
intervention on another event that also affects expectations could raise the probability of
success. Humpage (1996) concluded that coordinating intervention with another central
bank can improve the probability of success.  That paper also found that engaging in very
large interventions seemed to increase the probability of success, and that simultaneously
undertaking compatible monetary-policy changes guaranteed it.
Most of the successes in this paper were concentrated in two subperiods, that
following the Plaza Accord and that following the 1987 stock-market crash.  Empirical
results in intervention studies are often not robust across time periods, which suggests
that intervention’s marginal contribution to information flows varies with market
circumstances.  The Plaza period and the stock-market period were by uncertainty about
future U.S. monetary policy.  Under such circumstances, official information about the
market may be particularly valuable.17
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ENDNOTES
                                                
1  Under the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) of the
U.S. Treasury maintains primary responsibility for intervention in the United States.  The
Federal Reserve intervenes both as the ESF’s agent and for its own account.  Usually, the
Fed and Treasury act in concert and split the transactions equally between their accounts.
2  Dominguez and Frankel (1993) provide direct evidence that intervention affects
expectations, but the connection between intervention and future monetary policy
changes remains controversial.  Dominguez (1992) offers an early instance of monetary
policy signaling.  Lewis (1995) finds that intervention Granger-causes some U.S.
monetary policy variables between 1985 and 1990, but suggests that the short-run
relationship may reflect the timing of sterilization.  Klein and Rosengren (1991) conclude
that intervention did not precede monetary-policy changes between late 1985 and late
1987.  Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) offer evidence of signaling, but often in an
inconsistent direction.
3  In LeBaron (1996) and Neely and Weller (1997), profits from technical trading rules
increase when those rules incorporate information about intervention, suggesting that
intervention conveys information.
4  To apply the tests, one must consider sales and purchases of foreign exchange
separately.  The United States never bought and sold foreign exchange in close time
proximity.
5  The information flows investigated in Chang and Taylor (1998) and Ederington and
Lee (1995) justify restricting the duration to a short (one-day) period.
6  Henceforth, I drop the time subscripts.
7  Interventions that are consistently wrong also convey useful information to the market.
The market can profit by betting against the intervention: Sell when the Fed buys.
LeBaron (1996) and Neely and Weller (1997) found that profitable technical trading rules
often traded against the Fed.
8  That is, I reject if one minus the cumulative density function for the hypergeometric
distribution (1-CDF) is less that 5 percent.
9  The subperiods exclude January 3, 1985 through September 20, 1985, because the
United States only intervened on eight days; January 2, 1986 through February 20, 1987,
because the United States only intervened once, and May 1, 1990 through July 7, 1990,
because the 17 operations against German marks did not attempt to affect exchange rates.
The Fed undertook these to adjust ESF balances and to facilitate a reversal of outstanding22
                                                                                                                                                
warehousing operations.  A warehousing operation is a swap between the Fed and the
ESF whereby the Fed acquires foreign exchange and the ESF receives dollars.
10  The Group of Five (G5) countries are France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.
11  The Group of Seven (G7) countries are the G5 countries plus Canada and Italy.Table 1:  Full Sample Period    January 4, 1985 to March 3,1997
Observations = 3072
Success #1: App./Dep.  Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales  (w1s) 76 35 46% 1461 48% 0.024 0.975 0.999 0.559
      Purchases  (w1b) 138 51 37% 1564 51% 0.033 0.942 0.975 0.999 Negative
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales  (w1s) 82 34 41% 1523 50% 0.022 0.969 0.991 0.916
      Purchases  (w1b) 108 50 46% 1466 48% 0.034 0.964 0.998 0.580
Success #2:  Change Direction  Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales (w2s) 76 24 32% 747 24% 0.032 0.978 1.010 0.055
      Purchases (w2b) 138 36 26% 779 25% 0.046 0.956 1.002 0.376
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales (w2s) 82 24 29% 754 25% 0.032 0.975 1.007 0.129
      Purchases (w2b) 108 30 28% 746 24% 0.040 0.966 1.007 0.164
Success #3:  Leaning-Against Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales (w3s) 76 15 20% 473 15% 0.032 0.977 1.008 0.113
      Purchases (w3b) 138 28 20% 437 14% 0.064 0.958 1.022 0.017 Positive
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales (w3b) 82 29 35% 459 15% 0.063 0.980 1.043 0.000 Positive
      Purchases (w3s) 108 23 21% 488 16% 0.047 0.967 1.014 0.049 Positive
Success #4:  Leaning-With  Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales (w4s) 76 3 4% 258 8% 0.012 0.974 0.986 0.893
      Purchases (w4b) 138 5 4% 284 9% 0.018 0.952 0.970 0.991 Negative
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales (w4s) 82 1 1% 247 8% 0.004 0.971 0.975 0.992 Negative
      Purchases (w4b) 108 4 4% 234 8% 0.017 0.963 0.980 0.925Table 2:  Plaza Period  September 23, 1985 to December 31, 1985
Observations = 68
Success #1:  App./Dep. Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales  (w1s) 0 30 44%
      Purchases  (w1b) 14 6 43% 38 56% 0.158 0.733 0.891 0.788
against JAPANESE YEN
      Sales  (w1s) 0 25 37%
      Purchases  (w1b) 20 9 45% 42 62% 0.214 0.577 0.791 0.940
Success #2: Change Direction Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales  (w2s) 0 21 31%
      Purchases  (w2b) 14 4 29% 19 28% 0.211 0.796 1.006 0.338
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales  (w2s) 0 17 25%
      Purchases  (w2b) 20 5 25% 19 28% 0.263 0.694 0.957 0.513
Success #3:  Leanin-Against Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales  (w3s) 0 9 13%
      Purchases  (w3b)  14 2 14% 3 4% 0.667 0.815 1.482 0.007 Positive
against JAPANESE YEN
      Sales  (w3s) 0 13 19%
      Purchases  (w3b) 20 3 15% 5 7% 0.600 0.730 1.330 0.024 Positive
Success #4: Leaning-With Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales  (w4b)0 6 9 %
      Purchases  (w4s) 14 0 0% 10 15% 0.000 0.759 0.759 0.918
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales  (w4b) 0 8 12%
      Purchases  (w4s) 20 0 0% 2 3% 0.000 0.697 0.697 0.505Table 3:  First Louvre Period  February 23, 1987 to October 16, 1987
Observations = 167 
Success #1: App. / Dep. Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales  (w1s) 8 2 25% 81 49% 0.025 0.930 0.955 0.841
      Purchases  (w1b) 5 2 40% 84 50% 0.024 0.964 0.988 0.506
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales  (w1s) 25 9 36% 80 48% 0.113 0.816 0.929 0.859
      Purchases  (w1b) 0 83 50%
Success #2: Change Direction Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales  (w2s) 8 2 25% 47 28% 0.043 0.950 0.993 0.401
      Purchases  (w2b) 5 2 40% 47 28% 0.043 0.975 1.018 0.136
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales  (w2s) 25 8 32% 42 25% 0.190 0.864 1.054 0.135
      Purchases  (w2b) 0 43 26%
Success #3: Lean-Against Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales (w3s) 8 1 13% 23 14% 0.043 0.951 0.995 0.303
      Purchases  (w3b) 5 1 20% 25 15% 0.040 0.972 1.012 0.162
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales (w3s) 25 9 36% 27 16% 0.333 0.886 1.219 0.002 Positive
      Purchases  (w3b) 0 27 16%
Success #4: Lean-With Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales (w4s) 8 0 0% 9 5% 0.000 0.949 0.949 0.364
      Purchases  (w4b) 5 0 0% 12 7% 0.000 0.968 0.968 0.314
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales (w4s) 25 0 0% 11 7% 0.000 0.840 0.840 0.842
      Purchases  (w4b) 0 12 7%Table 4: Second Louvre Period  October 19, 1987 to December 30, 1987
Observations = 303
Success #1: App. / Dep. Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales  (w1s) 29 14 48% 149 49% 0.094 0.903 0.997 0.463
      Purchases  (w1b) 26 8 31% 149 49% 0.054 0.883 0.937 0.962 Negative
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales  (w1s) 39 16 41% 154 51% 0.104 0.846 0.950 0.873
      Purchases  (w1b) 0 142 47%
Success #2: Change Direction Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales  (w2s) 29 10 34% 78 26% 0.128 0.916 1.044 0.091
      Purchases  (w2b) 26 7 27% 74 24% 0.095 0.917 1.012 0.284
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales  (w2s) 39 11 28% 85 28% 0.129 0.872 1.001 0.408
      Purchases  (w2b) 0 72 24%
Success #3: Lean-Against Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales (w3s) 29 10 34% 44 15% 0.227 0.927 1.154 0.001 Positive
      Purchases  (w3b) 26 7 27% 43 14% 0.163 0.927 1.090 0.019 Positive
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales (w3s) 39 16 41% 46 15% 0.348 0.911 1.258 0.000 Positive
      Purchases  (w3b) 0 46 15%
Success #4: Lean-With Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales (w4s) 29 0 0% 25 8% 0.000 0.896 0.896 0.928
      Purchases  (w4b) 26 0 0% 29 10% 0.000 0.905 0.905 0.935
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales (w4s) 39 1 3% 22 7% 0.045 0.865 0.910 0.806
      Purchases  (w4b) 0 23 8%Table 5:  Third Louvre Period  January 3, 1989 to April 30, 1990
Observations = 335
Success #1: App. / Dep. Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales  (w1s) 0 168 50%
      Purchases  (w1b) 79 31 39% 161 48% 0.193 0.724 0.917 0.952 Negative
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales  (w1s) 0 180 54%
      Purchases  (w1b) 83 39 47% 146 44% 0.267 0.767 1.034 0.198
Success #2: Change Direction Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales  (w2s) 0 87 26%
      Purchases  (w2b) 79 21 27% 87 26% 0.241 0.766 1.008 0.382
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales  (w2s) 0 79 24%
      Purchases  (w2b) 83 24 29% 83 25% 0.289 0.766 1.055 0.125
Success #3: Lean-Against Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales (w3s) 0 0 46 14%
      Purchases  (w3b) 79 15 19% 50 15% 0.300 0.775 1.075 0.093
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales (w3s) 0 0 36 11%
      Purchases  (w3b) 83 18 22% 62 19% 0.290 0.762 1.052 0.153
Success #4: Lean-With Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales (w4s) 0 28 8%
      Purchases  (w4b) 79 4 5% 25 7% 0.160 0.758 0.918 0.746
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales (w4s) 0 36 11%
      Purchases  (w4b) 83 3 4% 24 7% 0.125 0.743 0.868 0.889Table 6: Limited Intervention August 1, 1990 to March 3, 1997
Observations = 1669
Success #1: App. / Dep. Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales  (w1s) 22 9 41% 800 48% 0.011 0.985 0.996 0.672
      Purchases  (w1b) 6 2 33% 845 51% 0.002 0.995 0.998 0.668
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales  (w1s) 17 8 47% 842 50% 0.010 0.989 0.999 0.515
      Purchases  (w1b) 4 2 50% 781 47% 0.003 0.998 1.000 0.266
Success #2: Change Direction Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales  (w2s) 22 6 27% 397 24% 0.015 0.987 1.003 0.254
      Purchases  (w2b) 6 1 17% 432 26% 0.002 0.996 0.998 0.487
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales  (w2s) 17 4 24% 409 25% 0.010 0.990 0.999 0.407
      Purchases  (w2b) 4 1 25% 404 24% 0.002 0.998 1.000 0.248
Success #3: Lean-Against Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales (w3s) 22 3 14% 247 15% 0.012 0.987 0.999 0.415
      Purchases  (w3b) 6 2 33% 253 15% 0.008 0.997 1.005 0.048 Positive
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales (w3s) 17 4 24% 242 14% 0.017 0.991 1.007 0.087
      Purchases  (w3b) 4 1 25% 283 17% 0.004 0.998 1.001 0.136
Success #4: Lean-With Intervention Virtual
against GERMAN MARKS Interventions Successes Percentage Successes Percentage P1 P2 P1 + P2 1 - CDF Value
      Sales (w4s) 22 0 0% 145 9% 0.000 0.986 0.986 0.866
      Purchases  (w4b) 6 1 17% 150 9% 0.007 0.997 1.003 0.095
against  JAPANESE YEN
      Sales (w4s) 17 0 0% 132 8% 0.000 0.989 0.989 0.755
      Purchases  (w4b) 4 1 25% 124 7% 0.008 0.998 1.006 0.030 Positive